HEALTH AND SAFETY – FROM PAPERWORK TO PRACTICE

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ABSTRACT

Safety professionals have a range of tools available to them to carry out safety studies. Many of these tools are aimed at the design phase, where safety is a key consideration, and mitigation can most readily implemented at minimum cost. Safety studies during the design phase typically consider the whole life cycle of the asset from construction through to operation, maintenance, and decommissioning / deconstruction of the asset.

This paper describes the challenges of translating the health and safety outcomes of paper-based studies into practical actions that must be carried out during construction, operation and maintenance. The paper draws on a case study from the Christchurch Wastewater Treatment Plant (CWTP), the trickling filters, which shows the value and necessity of undertaking hazard analysis and risk assessment studies throughout the life of a project.

There are various paper based studies that can be used at different stages throughout a project lifecycle to provide information on health and safety. During the design phase HAZOP and Safety in Design are effective methodologies. During construction Permit to Work paperwork combined with Job Safety Task Analysis methodology provides a platform for identifying and managing health and safety risk.

KEYWORDS (ARIAL, 11)

Health and Safety, Hazard, Risk, Operation and Maintenance, Job Safety Task Analysis, JSTA, Safety in Design, SiD

1 INTRODUCTION (ARIAL, 14)

Safety professionals have a range of tools available to them to carry out safety studies. Many of these tools are aimed at the design phase, where safety is a key consideration, and mitigation can most readily implemented at minimum cost. Safety studies during the design phase typically consider the whole life cycle of the asset from construction through to operation, maintenance, and decommissioning / deconstruction.

Commonly used methodologies for design phase safety studies include Hazard Identification (HAZID), Safety in Design (SiD), Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), and Risk Assessment, through to more formal Management of Change (MoC) and Layer of Protection Analysis (LoPA). All of these methodologies are paper-based and are undertaken in workshops, interviews or desk-top assessments. The studies typically involve identifying the hazards and assessing the associated risks. Controls are used to reduce the risk score to an acceptable value. The workhorse of health and safety during construction, as well as during operation and maintenance, is the Job Safety Task Analysis (JSTA). This methodology draws together the hazards, mitigation and associated risks from the design phase studies and applies them on a task by task basis to the activities that need to be carried out. Often new hazards are identified, associated with the actions required to carrying out individual tasks. The JSTA usually forms the basis of permit-to-work paperwork. When events do occur, these can be investigated using methodologies such as the Incident Cause Analysis Method (ICAM).

2 TRICKLING FILTER EARTHQUAKE REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE – A CASE STUDY

2.1 BACKGROUND

2.1.1 PROCESS DESCRIPTION

The CWTP receives untreated wastewater and removes or reduces various contaminants through a series of processing steps, see Figure 1.



Figure 1: CWTP Process Flow Diagram Showing Key Unit Processes

Initially the wastewater passes through a 3mm gap screen to remove large items. Heavy solids such as sand and grit are then removed in the grit traps. The wastewater then flows into the primary sedimentation tanks, where lighter, organic solids settle more slowly. These solids are removed and are pumped to the solids processing train, where they are digested and biogas produced.

The overflow (primary effluent) from the primary sedimentation tanks is pumped to two trickling filters operating in parallel. These trickling filters are large fixed bed reactors, filled with structured, PVC packing. The primary effluent is sprayed over the top of the packing and trickles down through the packing to the bottom of the trickling filter where it is collected. Microorganisms grow in a biofilm layer on the surface of the packing material which sloughs off periodically. The biomass feeds on the dissolved organic compounds present in the primary effluent.

The treated primary effluent and sloughed biomass pass to the secondary contact tanks. Fine air bubbles encourage further biomass growth and also facilitate biomass agglomeration. These agglomerated biomass solids then settle in the next process, the secondary clarifiers. A portion of the solids from the clarifiers are recycled to the contact tanks (creating a short retention activated sludge process). Waste sludge is pumped to the solids processing train (with the primary settled solids). The clarifier overflow flows to the oxidation ponds for final polishing and disinfection via sunlight, prior to discharge via a 3km long ocean outfall.

2.2 BACKGROUND

The two trickling filters at the CWTP were constructed in 1976 and 1977. They are over 20m diameter and 10m high and were originally open topped vessels (see figure 2). Since this time both trickling filters have undergone several upgrades, including the construction of a top cover to enclose the vessels and protect the packing material for UV damage. The original distribution arms have been were replaced and the central tower upgraded.

The trickling filters are in constant operation and the adverse atmosphere inside the trickling filters limits access for maintenance and repair activities. However, the trickling filters are a critical part of the treatment process at the CWTP, where the secondary treatment takes place. As a result the trickling filters are typically only taken off line, one at a time, once a decade. Furthermore, both trickling filters were damaged during the Christchurch earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. The nature of this damage meant that the trickling filters needed to be taken off line for repairs to be undertaken.

To minimise the disruption to CWTP operations, a combined programme was developed for maintenance and earthquake repairs. General maintenance and repair was undertaken by both CWTP operations staff and earthquake repairs were undertaken by a contractor.



Figure 2: CWTP Trickling Filters

2.3 JOB SAFETY TASK ANALYSIS

2.3.1 JSTA

A JSTA was used to identify hazards to people and plant/equipment for the construction phase activities. A JSTA is a methodology for systematically assessing the individual tasks involved in a project or job. For each task the potential hazards were identified. The consequence and likelihood for each hazard was considered and from this the risk was assessed. Mitigation efforts then focused on the highest risks. Risks to not only people, but also the plant/equipment were considered during the preparation of the JSTA. It was important to consider both the removal and reinstallation of equipment as separate tasks. This resulted in a large number of hazards being identified in the JSTA. Most were assessed as low or very low risk.

A great many individual tasks were identified to carry out the trickling filter repairs and maintenance, which resulted in a large number of hazards being identified in the JSTA. Most were assessed as low or very low risk. The hazards assessed to have medium to high risk to people and plant/equipment are summarised in tables 1 and 2 respectively.

2.3.2 PTW

The JSTA is an important part of the PtW process. At CWTP the PtW is the key pathway for implementing the paperwork during construction and are required prior to commencing any work. The PtW system applies to contractors as well as CWTP Operations for undertaking construction, maintenance and repairs.

Hazards to Plant/Equipment	Consequence	Likelihood *								
PVC Media Damage – standing on media	PVC media is damaged as a result of working on media surface	Unlikely as plywood is placed over the media to protect it.								
PVC Media Damage – tool dropped from above	PVC media is damaged by falling tools	Possible if tools are dropped								
Crane – equipment placed incorrectly	Equipment placed incorrectly resulting damage to the trickling filter of the media	Possible. All lifts to be planned and spotter is in constant communication with crane operator								
*In this summary the likelihood presented is following the implementation of controls to eliminate, mitigate, and/or manage the hazard										

Table 1: Medium to High Risk Hazards to Plant/Equipment

Table 2: N	Medium to	High Risk	Hazards	to People
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Hazards to People	Consequence	Likelihood *								
Fall from height – slip while	Fall from the roof to the floor	Unlikely as fall protection was								
working on the trickling filter	(over 10 metres) resulting in	mandatory (e.g. fall arrestors,								
roof	serious injury or death	scaffolding, etc)								
Spain or strain - injury lifting	Injury to back or muscles	Unlikely as roof panels designed								
or pulling heavy roof panels		to be removed. Crane on standby								
		to assist if panels are stuck shut								
		and difficult to open								
Falling tools – tool dropped	People working below are	Unlikely as access to upper level								
from above	injured from falling tools	is restricted when people are								
		working below								
Spain or strain - injury lifting	Injury to back or muscles	Unlikely as crane available for								
heavy material/equipment		heavy lifts and roof panels								
		removed to provide crane access								
Falls – falling from scaffold or	Injury such as broken bones	Unlikely as scaffold and staircase								
staircase		designed to minimise falls								
Electrocution – temporary	Electrocution due to faulty	Unlikely as all electrical wiring								
lighting installed	wiring or installation	is checked and tagged as suitable								
		prior to use								
Fall from height - fall into	Fall into central riser pipe	Unlikely as mesh cover to be								
central riser pipe	resulting in serious injury or	installed over riser pipe								
	death									
Crane injury – hit by crane	Hit by crane as crane operator	Unlikely as spotter to be in								
	cannot see inside trickling filter	constant communication with								
		crane operator and all personnel								
		outside trickling filter during lifts								
Crushing injury – heavy	Person crushed by heavy	Possible. Spotter to be in								
equipment incorrectly placed	equipment	constant communication with								
		crane operator								
Suffocation – trickling filter	Low oxygen levels in the	Use confined space protocols								
subfloor is a confined space	subfloor space could lead to	including testing for oxygen								
	suffocation	levels, constant radio contact,								
	Y and a second and the second se	recovery plan, ventilation								
Sufficient of the sufficiency of	Low oxygen levels inside the	lesting for oxygen levels,								
biomass inside trickling filter	unching inter could lead to	recovery plan, ventilation								
Infection from contact with	Skin infection moningitie	Immunisations personal hygiana								
hismage on bitog from	Skill infection, mennights,	such as hand washing and								
fligs/insects	leading to stekness of death	showering								
Illness from contact with	Ill health yomiting diarrhea	Personal hygiene such as hand								
hiomass	in nearmi, voinnung, utarritea	washing and showering Isolation								
biomass		of trickling filter tagged and								
		tested.								
Crushing injury – trench	Trenches down to deep	Unlikely as sheet piling used in								
collapse	underground pipes could	all deep trenches								
	collapse, leading to injury or									
	death									
*In this summary the likelihood	presented is following the implem	entation of controls to eliminate.								
mitigate, and/or manage the hazard										

2.4 SAFETY IN DESIGN

JSTA methodologies are not effective for identifying hazards to the environment. SiD methodology was used to identify and assess the hazards posed to the environment. A SiD workshop was undertaken during the design of the earthquake repair works. The workshop involved both the design team and the operations team. The SiD study included a structured workshop facilitated by an experienced and independent facilitator. A set of standard guidewords were used to test the design with respect to safety. The four phases of asset life were considered, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning. Two main hazards to the environment were identified:

- Malodorous discharges to air
- Insufficient wastewater treatment

These were linked, as inadequate wastewater treatment could lead to offensively odorous discharges being released. Each hazard had several possible causes, as shown in Table 3.

Hazards to Environment	Consequence	Likelihood *				
Malodorous discharges to air –	Odour complaints from local	Possible – this occurred last time				
due to incorrectly taking	residents in breach of resource	the trickling filters were taken				
trickling filters off line	consents resulting in fines.	off line				
Malodorous discharges to air –	Odour complaints from local	Possible – all secondary contact				
due to secondary contact tank	residents in breach of resource	tanks will need to be in service				
performing poorly	consents resulting in fines.					
Malodorous discharges to air –	Odour complaints from local	Possible – ponds have been				
due to oxidation ponds	residents in breach of resource	overloaded in the past				
becoming overloaded	consents resulting in fines.	_				
Inadequate wastewater	Discharges exceeding resource	Possible				
treatment -due to secondary	consent conditions resulting in					
contact tank performing	fines					
poorly						
Inadequate wastewater	Discharges exceeding resource	Possible				
treatment -due to oxidation	consent conditions resulting in					
ponds becoming overloaded	fines					
*In this summary the likelihood	presented is following the implem	nentation of controls to eliminate,				
mitigate, and/or manage the hazard						

Table 3: Medium to High Risk Hazards to Environment

3 PUTTING THE PAPERWORK INTO PRACTISE

3.1 PLANNING

Planning is a key factor for successfully putting the paperwork into practice. Forward planning prior to taking the tricking filters off line was critical to managing the hazards and the associated risks that had been identified through the JSTA and SiD.

The trickling filters at the CWTP are hydraulically limited, particularly in winter. In Christchurch in winter there is more rainfall and the ground water level is higher. With the earthquake damage to the underground wastewater pipe network, there is significant ingress of water into the wastewater pipework. This results in a

higher volume of lower concentration wastewater arriving at the CWTP for treatment and a higher flow through the trickling filters. At these higher flows both trickling filters are required to be in operation.

During the summer months the flow of wastewater through the CWTP is lower. In the driest summer months (December through to March) it is possible to have only one trickling filter in operation and still achieve adequate wastewater treatment. For this reason the trickling filter repairs were scheduled for the summer months of January through to March.

Relying solely on dry summer weather was considered high risk. Christchurch can have significant wet weather events in the middle of summer. In a summer storm event (high rainfall), a single trickling filter would struggle to treat the full wastewater flow. Thus back-up plans were put in place to actively manage the wastewater treatment:

- The operation of the solids contact tanks was changed. Normally this unit process operates in two parallel trains; one for each trickling filter. Instead the solids contact tanks were temporarily reconfigured so that the wastewater flowed through the tanks in series. This facilitated floc formation by making full use of the solid contact tank volume and improved solids settling in the down-stream clarifiers.
- Operating a higher flow through a single trickling filter can increase biomass sloughing and result in a smaller biomass particle being sloughed off. These smaller particles make floc formation problematic (in the solid contact tanks) and as a result be difficult to separate (in the clarifiers). This would result in excessive biomass being carried out to the polishing ponds, adversely affecting the pond performance and resulting in significant malodorous discharges. To mitigate this, flocculent dosing equipment was put on standby and a suitable polymer flocculant was sourced. This flocculent dosing system was used during the project to improve the performance of the solids contact tanks.
- In a high rainfall event, it was likely that some primary effluent from the primary sedimentation tanks would be by-passed around the secondary treatment (trickling filters, secondary contact tanks and clarifiers), and be diverted directly to the polishing ponds. This partially treated wastewater would have higher concentration of contaminants which, in turn, could negatively affect the pond performance and result in significant malodorous discharges. To mitigate this, a chemical dosing system, using hydrogen peroxide, was put on standby. This dosing equipment would be used to dose hydrogen peroxide directly into the bypassed wastewater, increasing the oxygen concentration of the wastewater, and thereby boosting the performance of the ponds. This back-up chemical dosing system was not used during the project.

3.2 CONSTRUCTION

The contractor was engaged under at NZS3910 contract. The contractor was required to prepare a Site Specific Health and Safety Management Plan. This plan provided information on how safety would be managed on the construction site. It included traffic management, people health and safety management, environmental management, and work method statements.

Daily, weekly and monthly site inspections were undertaken to monitor health and safety on the work site. The daily and weekly site inspections were carried out by the contractor, whilst the monthly inspections were carried out by a specialist health and safety practitioner. The purpose of these inspection was to practically identify potential hazards and address these before an incident occurred. The following hazards were identified during construction:

- A power cord on electrical equipment. The necessary testing was carried out.
- Scaffolding that had an out of date "scaff-tag". The scaffold was reviewed and a new tag issued
- Inadequate fencing around the construction. Additional fencing was installed.

Personnel access to site was carefully managed. The CWTP is an operating wastewater treatment plant, with operations, maintenance staff moving around. Also, maintenance staff were undertaking works in the same space as the contract works. This was managed through regular project meetings and programme updates. At these meetings health and safety was specifically included on the agenda. The interface between the contractor's activities and CWTP maintenance and repair activities was a high risk that needed to be actively managed. These activities were identified during the JSTA, which allowed solution to developed well in advance of the works being undertaken

CWTP site wide weekly toolbox meeting, where activities on site are discussed by operations and maintenance staff. This provided a mechanism for circulating information around CWTP.

3.3 PROGRAMMING WORKS

With the range of people involved in this project, coordinating these inputs was critical to keeping people, plant/equipment and the environment safe. A comprehensive project programme was developed. The programme for the second half of the works is shown in Appendix A. This included the contractor's construction programme and the operations staff maintenance programme. Programming provided a mechanism for clearly demonstrating what activities were being undertaken, when, and by whom. Hazards associated with each achieved were then readily communicated around the project team.

The programme was a live document, particularly while the earthquake damage assessments were being undertaken. During this phase the programme was updated to show activities required to undertake these additional repairs.

4 OUTCOME

JSTA effectively identified hazards to people and the plant/equipment. SiD methodologies identified environmental hazards. SiD methodologies, JSA methodologies and programme planning were invaluable tools for achieving this. Contingency plans are a necessity, especially for events you cannot control, such as the weather.

There was a single incident during the construction phase of this project. This occurred while the preparations were being made to deconstruct the central rotary distribution tower. The trickling filter had been isolated using slide gates. One of these gates had failed to completely close. A wet weather event occurred, subtly changing the hydraulics through the CWTP. Partially treated wastewater flowed back though this incorrectly closed gate valve, backed up the distribution tower and then trickled down onto a worker beneath. Work immediately halted while the situation was remedied and a physical break was put in the feed pipework.

Given that the construction phase of the project duration spanned 18 month, this is a very good outcome.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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- CWTP Maintenance Team, especially Bruce Cassidy, CWTP Maintenance Team Leader
- CWTP Operations Team
- G&T Construction, especially Lex Thomson, General Manager

APPENDIX A PROGRAMMES OF WORKS FOR TRICKLING FILTER 2 REPAIRS



	Trickling Filter 2 Programme for Offline Repairs																
ID	WBS Task Name			Duration	Start	Finish	Predecessors	21 Outstan			11 Day				January 2016		
								9/11		30/11	21/12		1.01	1/02	22/02	14/03	
100	10.1 Remove cover	from pipe opening		0 days	Tue 16/02/16	Tue 16/02/1	6.99								16/02		
102	10.2 Remove cover	fram Tower opening		0 days	Tue 16/02/16	Tue 16/02/1	6 101								16/02		
103	10.3 Place Tower			1 dar	Tue 16/02/16	Tue 16/02/1	6 102								Jason, Nick, CRANE, Contractor Staff 2 (TI	BC), Contractor Staff 1 (A	Van)
104	10.4 Assemble Arm	s (Connect Flanges)		1.5 day	Wed 17/02/16	Thu 18/02/1	6 103								Jason Nick, Contractor Staff 2 (TBC), C	ontractor Staff 1 (Alan),C Alam) Contractor Staff 2	CRANE
106	10.6 Remove physic	od blocks placed under the arms		2 days	Tue 23/02/16	Wed 24/02/1	6 105								Jason,Nick,Contractor Staf	1 (Alan),Contractor Stal	# 2 (TBC)
107	10.7 Inspect tension			1 da	Thu 25/02/16	Thu 25/02/1	6 106								Jason,Nick,Contractor St	off 1 (Alan),Contractor St	itaff 2 (TBC)
108	10.8 Check assemb	ly		1 day	Fri 26/02/16	Fri 26/02/1	6 107								Jason		
110	11 Secure Accesse	Tower, Arms and Tre Roos re-assen	полга	1.75 day	Mon 29/02/16	Tue 1/03/1	0 199								0.002		
111	11.1 remove plywor	d walkway platform		1 day	Mon 29/02/16	Mon 29/02/1	6 109								Jason,Nick,Centra	ctor Staff 1 (Alan),Contra	actor Staff 2
112	11.2 remove scaffs	olding		0.25 days	Tue 1/03/16	Tue 1/03/1	6111								Southern Lake Sc	affholding	
113	11.3 side back doo	rs and covers		0.5 days	Tue 1/05/18	Tue 1/03/1	6 112								Jason, Nick		
115	12 Commissioning	& Start up of FGR process		2.5 days	Tue 1/03/16	Fri 4/03/1	6										
116	12.1 De-isolate FG			1.5 days	Tue 1/03/16	Thu 3/03/1	6113								Lee Liaw, Jase		
117	12.2 Stop Dasing a	Polymer		0 days	Thu 3/03/16	Thu 3/03/1	6 116								3/03		
118	12.3 Start Pumps 12.4 Monitor termos	rature COD levels, etc for 2 weeks		1 da	F4.403/16	Fri 403/1	6 116 6 118								4/03		
120	12.5 Checkpoint - a	I measurements are within limits		0 days	Fri 4/03/16	Fri 4/03/1	6 119								4/03		
121	M12 Milestone - FGR	process operational		0 days	Fri 4/03/10	Fri 4/03/1	6 120								4/03		
122	13 Post shut tasklis	1		1 dag	Fri 4/03/16	Mon 7/03/1	6 121									n	
124	13.2 debrief session	meetings		1 da	Fit 4/03/16	Mon 7/03/1	6 121								Bruce C	Jason	
125	13.3 Post shut repo	rt (time, costs, learnings, etc)		1 dag	Fit 4/03/16	Mon 7/03/1	6 12 1								Bruce C	Jason	
		Task	5	Summary		External Milestone	+	Inactive Miles	tone O	Duration-only		Start-only	6	Deadline	\$		
Project: C	VTP Asset Management - F	Split		Project Summary		Inactive Task		Inactive Sum	mary 🖓 🖂	7 Manual Summary Rolli	P	Finish-only	3				
- ore: 1/60	1911110	Miestone 🔶	E	atornal Tasks		Inactive Task		Marual Task	6	Manual Summary	· · ·	Progress					

	CWTP TRICKLING FILTERS EXTERNAL & PIPEWORK REPAIRS TENDER PROGRAMME														
	NSTRUCTION LTD														
ID	Task Name	Duration	Start Finish	15/05 23/05	July 30/05	7/07 14/07	21/07	August 28/07 4/08	11/08 18	108 25/08	September 1/09	8/09 15/09 22/09	October 29/09 5/10	13/10 20/10	November 27/10 3/11
0	CWTP Trickling Filter & pipe repairs	224 days	Mon 30/06/1 Thu 7/05/1	5	0										
1	P&G items	125 days	Mon 30/06/14 Fri 19/12/14		0								,		
2	Prepare and submit management plans	20 days	Mon 30/06/14 Fri 25/07/14	-											
-	Order & delivery of our autorian equipment	120 days	Mon 30/06/14 Fri 12/12/14	_											
5	Order manufacture & delivery of nine	20 days	Mon 15/09/14 Fri 19/12/14	-											
6	Separable Portion 1 - RAS pipe repair	76 days	Mon 18/08/14 Mon 1/12/14						-						
7	Site establishment	5 days	Mon 18/08/14 Fri 22/08/14	-					_	-					
8	Order, manufacture & delivery of slidegates	25 days	Tue 9/09/14 Mon 13/10/1	6										h	
9	Construct new inlet chamber at SCT headwork's	15 days	Tue 7/10/14 Mon 27/10/1	6									+	, ,	<u>1</u>
10	Commission new inlet chamber & isolate 1350 ber	nd 2 days	Tue 28/10/14 Wed 29/10/1	8											-
11	Excavate & expose existing 1350 RAS bend	4 days	Thu 30/10/14 Tue 4/11/14												
12	Demolition to existing bend	3 days	Wed 5/11/14 Fri 7/11/14												
13	Install new bend	5 days	Mon 10/11/14 Fri 14/11/14												-
14	Install connection to Pump station is oypass	3 days	Nich 1//11/14 Web 19/11/1												
16	Backfill & reinstate	5 days	Tue 25/11/14 Mon 1/12/14	•											
17	Senarable Portion 2 - Trickling Filter 1 renairs	109 days	Mon 6/10/14 Thu 5/03/15	_											
18	Concrete work & ducting	57 days	Mon 6/10/14 Tue 23/12/14												
19	Manufacture & delivery of precast plenums	40 days	Mon 6/10/14 Fri 28/11/14	-											
20	Install temporary ducting	3 days	Mon 6/10/14 Wed 8/10/14												
21	Demolish existing plenum & duct	20 days	Thu 9/10/14 Wed 5/11/14										<u> </u>		
22	Construct new concrete band	40 days	Tue 14/10/14 Mon 8/12/14										Ģ		
23	Construct new concrete foundation slab	25 days	Tue 21/10/14 Mon 24/11/1	8										*	
24	Install new plenum and GRP duct in stages	40 days	Tue 28/10/14 Mon 22/12/1	1										9	
25	Reinstate lawn areas & paving	4 days	Thu 18/12/14 Tue 23/12/14	_											
26	Pipe repairs	69 days	Mon 1/12/14 Thu 5/03/15												
27	Install temporary works to pipe trench	15 days	Mon 1/12/14 Fri 19/12/14												
29	Commission over pumping	2 days	Tue 20/01/15 Wed 21/01/1	5											
30	Excavate and remove damaged pipework	4 days	Thu 22/01/15 Tue 27/01/15	-											
31	Install pipe trench Basecourse	5 days	Wed 28/01/15 Tue 3/02/15												
32	Install & connect new PE pipe work	7 days	Wed 4/02/15 Thu 12/02/15												
33	Test pipework	3 days	Fri 13/02/15 Tue 17/02/15												
34	Backfill & reinstatements to pipe trench	7 days	Wed 18/02/15 Thu 26/02/15	_											
35	Remove temporary works	3 days	Fri 27/02/15 Tue 3/03/15	_											
- 22	Kemave over pumping equipment	2 days	Wed 4/03/15 Thu 5/03/15	-											
37	Concrete work & ducting	79 days	Mon 19/01/15 The 7/05/15	_											
39	Manufacture & delivery of precast plenums	20 days	Mon 19/01/15 Fri 13/02/15	-											
40	Install temporary ducting	4 days	Mon 26/01/15 Thu 29/01/15	-											
41	Demolish existing plenum & duct	20 days	Fri 30/01/15 Thu 26/02/15	1											
42	Construct new concrete band	40 days	Fri 6/02/15 Thu 2/04/15												
43	Construct new concrete foundation slab	25 days	Fri 20/02/15 Thu 26/03/15												
- 44	Install new plenum and GRP duct in stages	45 days	Fri 27/02/15 Thu 30/04/15	-											
45	Reinstate lawn areas & paving	5 days	Fri 1/05/15 Thu 7/05/15												
40	Pipe repairs	45 6895	Fil 6/03/15 Thu 7/05/15	_											
47	Initial output power working of costols	S days	Fri 13/03/15 Thu 14/03/15												
40	Install temporary works to pipe trench	5 days	Fri 20/03/15 Thu 26/03/15	-											
50	Commission over pumping	2 days	Fri 27/03/15 Mon 30/03/1	5											
51	Excavate and remove damaged pipework	5 days	Tue 31/03/15 Mon 6/04/15												
52	Install pipe trench Basecourse	5 days	Tue 7/04/15 Mon 13/04/1	5											
53	Install & connect new PE pipe work	5 days	Tue 14/08/15 Mon 20/04/1	5											
54	Test pipework	2 days	Tue 21/04/15 Wed 22/04/1	5											
55	Backfill & reinstatements to pipe trench	5 days	Thu 23/04/15 Wed 29/04/1	5											
56	Remove temporary works	2 days	Thu 30/04/15 Fri 1/05/15	-											
57	numure over pamping equipment	4 days	mon 4/03/15 Ind 7/05/15												
Project	: CWTP Trickling Filter & p Task	_	Milestone •	Project Summary	Q	External Milestone	¢	Inactive Milestone	0	Manual Task	¢	Matual Summary Rollup	Start-only	Deadline	*
Date: 1	ue 9/09/14 Split		Summary	External Tasks		Inactive Task		 Inactive Summary 	~	Duration-only		Manual Summary	Finish-only	Progress	
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