

Looking away from the rear view mirror: making better decisions in a time of uncertainty


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
The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there

'The Go-Between' – L. P. Hartley, 1953



What is normal? What needs to adapt?





In 2013 the Australian Bureau of Meteorology added a new colour for over 52 degrees (previous maximum was 50C) In 2017 the US National Weather Service added new colour for precipitation over 30 inches (their previous maximum was 15 inches)

Adaptation agenda concerns not just the built environment, or our planning and engineering, but also the norms of making decisions and how we conduct science

Is 'unprecedented' the new 'normal'?





The Washington Post

Democracy Dies in Darkness

Wonkblog | Analysis

Houston is experiencing its third '500-year' flood in 3 years. How is that possible?

By Christopher Ingraham

August 29, 2017 at 7:30 AM



This drone video taken Aug. 27 shows the historic flooding in Houston caused by Hurricane Harvey. (ahmed.gul/Instagram)

Hurricane Harvey has brought "500-year"

Raises number of questions: not just is it a 1-in-a-500 event? But how useful is the past in influencing future decision making? Is the past a foreign country?



Houston Hobby Airport's runways were underwater-most are outside of the 0.2% of flooding/1-in-500 year flood zone





Uncertainty and climate – is the past a good indicator? Dynamic v static.



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
- Climate is changing rapidly
- How confident are we that we know and understand the future?
 Will uncertainty rise?
- Can our decision making engage with complexity & uncertainty?






Increasing number of records broken







'Extremes' becoming more frequent?










@climateofgavin

'Its not your imagination summers are getting hotter', New York Times, 28 July 2017

In Climate Terms Standing Still is Moving Backwards






Its outd

Sea level sets a baseline for storm surge—the potentially destructive rise in sea height that occurs during a coastal storm. As local sea level rises, so does that baseline, allowing coastal storm surges to penetrate farther inland. With higher global sea levels in 2050 and 2100, areas much farther inland would be at risk of being flooded. The extent of local flooding also depends on factors like tides, natural and artificial barriers, and the contours of coastal land.

© Union of Concerned Scientists 2015; www.ucsusa.org/sealevelrisescience

Complex & dynamic intersection of hazards






Shoreline erosion, Cape Palliser, Wairarapa, 2016


Mokau spit (Waitomo DC) - you can see where the 1950 property boundaries used to extend to

The dynamism also links to the social & political





- The Addicks reservoir in Houston was built in 1930 to withstand a 1-in-a-1000 year event.
- Now due to fast development is in the middle of surburbia



Climate interacts with other public policy





Percentage Impervious Surface Houston, TX Area @stephenmstrader % Impervious Surface 0.01 - 0.1 0.11 - 0.50.5 - 1 1.1 - 2 1940 2017 2.1 - 3 5.1 - 15 15.1 - 25 25.1 - 50 50.1 - 100

Texas Tribune, Dec 16 2016

Stephen M. Strader

@StephenMStrader



Flood Events	Year	Estimated properties at risk (23m total in 2011)			
** 1947 ** 1953		Rivers & Sea	Surface Water	Groundwater	Total
1998 2000	2001				
	2004				
	2009				
	2015				



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1947 1953		Rivers & Sea	Surface Water	Groundwater	Total
# 1998 # 2000	2001	1,724,225	0	0	1,724,225
2002	2004				
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2004 2005 2007 2008 2009	2009	2,400,000	3,800,000	1,700,000	6,800,000
	2015				




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	2015	2,641,000	3,181,000	Between 122,000 and 290,000	6112,000


The scientific manufacture of UNcertainty...



Growing complexity

- more data=same uncertainty?
 better knowledge of interactions
 but while models have got better,
 they are no better at predicting
 (Batty, 2015)
- Advances in climate models, but uncertainty range unchanged for 30 years (Roe and Baker 2007)
- Cascading effects, moving targets,
 Earthquakes, causing landslides,
 due to sodden ground





The policy challenge of manufacturing certainty



- Policy needs to manufacture certainty
 - Faster decisions, less 'red-tape', but less scope for politics and complexity?
 - quantifying risk good for DM can defend institutions, deflect blame, provides political justification, avoids liabilities
 - but 'false precision' (White 2013), 'stationarity is dead' (Milly et al 2008)?
- Decision methods provide trust in expert systems (Giddens 1990) so techno-political
 - Ewald (1991, 207): 'to calculate a risk is to master time, to discipline the future'
 - Tend to look for 'laws' (O'Neill 2001) to code uncertainty - 1 in a 100 event
 - Set artificial boundaries of impact and time – ie CBA (Lane et al 2014; White & Haughton 2017)



Climate Change through the rear view mirror





- Similar characteristics of persistent problems that the NSCs are designed to address: interdisciplinary, complex, uncertain, dynamic, etc.
- Acknowledge that the ways the science-policy-practice interface has worked has not been effective in the past.
- We SHOULD be disrupting existing ways of working and knowing but these may RESIST change. Our systems are designed to be stable for efficient decision making; path dependencies, institutional inertias, practice norms, etc.
- structures/worldviews of Important that we focus on the system decision making as well as th policy copyright © Bill Frymire

Key messages





- Decision making needs to adapt alongside our built environment and the ways we
 conduct science need to be able to engage with complexity and uncertainty, and
 prepare for the future differently
- How can we create the political space for complex, value laden decisions to be debated, or long-term strategies put in place that can better engage with complexity and uncertainty?
- Climate change will be affected by other public policy trends we need to ensure that we don't fast track impacts alongside new developments
- Reflective, 'boundary' researchers, policy-makers, and practitioners To what
 extent can your existing ways of working and knowing your tools, processes,
 science, relationships, etc, incorporate these non-normal issues?

Thank you



- White, I. and Haughton, G. (2017) Risky times: Hazard management and the tyranny of the present, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 22: 412-19
- White, I. (2017) 'Past, Present and Future Water: the challenges in creating more beneficial trajectories', in Bell, S., Allen, A., Hofmann, P. and Teh, T-H. (eds) Urban Water Trajectories, Springer: London. 165-178
- White, I. (2013) 'The more we know, the more we don't know: Reflections on a decade of planning, flood risk management and false precision, *Planning Theory* and Practice 14 (1): 106-114. Planning-Theory-and-Practice-Special-Issue-on-Flooding.pdf

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